A model of negotiation scenarios based on time, relevance andcontrol used to define advantageous positions in a negotiation

Omar Guillermo Rojas Altamirano, Carlos López Hernández

Resumen


Models that apply to negotiation are based on different perspectives that range from the relationship between the actors, game theory or the steps in a procedure. This research proposes a model of negotiation scenarios that considers three factors (time, relevance and control), which are displayed as the most important in a negotiation. These factors interact with each other and create different scenarios for each of the actors involved in a negotiation. The proposed model not only facilitates the creation of a negotiation strategy but also an ideal choice of effective tactics. 


Palabras clave


negotiation; strategy

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Referencias


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MERCADOS y Negocios, Año 20, No. 39, (enero – junio, 2019), es una publicación semestral editada por la Universidad de Guadalajara, a través del Departamento de Mercadotecnia y Negocios Internacionales, del Centro Universitario de Ciencias Económico Administrativas (CUCEA). Con domicilio en Periférico Norte 799, módulo G-306, núcleo Los Belenes, Zapopan, Jalisco, México, C.P. 45100., Telefono 33-3770-3343 ext. 25068, http://www.revistascientificas.udg.mx/index.php/MYN, correo electrónico: revistamercadosynegocios@cucea.udg.mx. Editor responsable: José Sánchez Gutiérrez. Reservas de Derechos al Uso Exclusivo 04-2016-111115025800-203, ISSN electrónico: 2594-0163, otorgados por el Instituto Nacional del Derecho de Autor. Responsable de la última actualización de este número: Departamento de Mercadotecnia y Negocios Internacionales del Centro Universitario de Ciencias Económico Administrativas (CUCEA), con domicilio en Periférico Norte 799, módulo G-306, núcleo Los Belenes, Zapopan, Jalisco, México, C.P. 45100, por Tania Elena González Alvarado. Fecha de la última modificación enero de 2019, con un tiraje de un ejemplar.

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